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Abstract:  This article examines the role of capital in financial institutions -- why
it is important, how market-generated capital 'requirements' differ from regulatory
requirements, and the form that regulatory requirements should take.  Along the
way, we examine historical trends in bank capital, problems in measuring capital,
and some possible unintended consequences of capital requirements.  Within this
framework, we evaluate how the contributors to the special issue of the same title
(JBF, April 1995) advance the literature and suggest topics for future research.I.  Introduction
The point of departure for all modern research on capital structure is the
Modigliani-Miller (M&M, 1958) proposition that in a frictionless world of full
information and complete markets, a firm's capital structure can not affect its
value.  This proposition contrasts sharply with the intuitive notion that a firm with
risk-free debt could borrow at an interest rate below the required return on equity,
reducing its weighted average cost of financing and increasing its value by
substituting debt for equity.  But the powerful arbitrage arguments employed by
M&M demonstrate that market prices will compensate for any leverage decision by
the firm.  When leverage is higher, so are the risks to shareholders, increasing the
costs of equity just enough so that the weighted average cost of financing remains
constant.  More general versions of M&M showed that the same result holds with
risky debt -- the costs of both equity and risky debt respond so that the cost of
financing is independent of leverage.  The challenge to those who have come after
M&M has been to identify credible departures from this frictionless world, analyze
the implications of these departures for `optimal' capital structure, and test these
implications against the empirical evidence.
This research is of particular relevance for financial institutions because
these institutions lack any plausible rationale in the frictionless world of M&M. 
Most of the past research on financial institutions has begun with a set of assumed
imperfections, such as taxes, costs of financial distress, transactions costs,
asymmetric information, and especially regulation.  Nonetheless, as Miller (1995)
argues below, these imperfections may not be important enough to overturn the2
M&M Proposition.  In contrast, most of the other papers in this special issue take
the view (implicitly or explicitly) that the deviations from M&M's frictionless world
are important, so that financial institutions may be able to enhance their market
values by taking on an `optimal' amount of leverage.
The purpose of this introductory article, and indeed this entire issue, is to
investigate the role of capital for financial institutions -- why it is important, how
market-generated capital `requirements' differ from regulatory requirements, and
the form that regulatory requirements should take.  In the process, we examine the
history of bank capital, discuss issues involved in implementing capital
requirements, analyze problems in measuring capital, and investigate some of the
unintended consequences of capital requirements.  We also point out how the
articles in the special issue contribute to this literature, as well as suggest topics for
future research.
Most of the analysis focuses on commercial banks in the United States,
although many of the arguments apply more broadly to other financial institutions
and regulatory systems.  Banks serve as a useful focus for analysis because many of
the frictions that make capital structure relevant -- costs of financial distress,
asymmetric information, transactions costs, and regulation -- have been carefully
studied in the banking literature.  Moreover, banks play an important role in the
global economy, and are the first category of institutions to be subject to
internationally coordinated capital regulation.  Finally, banks systematically have
the highest leverage of firms in any industry, in sharp contrast to the implications3
      Because of space constraints we have been unable to include all of the important
1
references on capital and we have focussed narrowly on capital without fully discussing
related issues such as deposit insurance pricing, optimal closure rules, and other means of
controlling risk.
      The value of banks is defined as the sum of market values of equity and debt.  For small,
2
closely-held banks without actively traded shares, we define market value of equity as the
discounted
net present value of expected future cash flows to shareholders.
of the M&M proposition, which predicts that capital structures should vary
randomly across firms and industries.
1
II. Why Do Markets `Require' Financial Institutions To Hold Capital?
In this section, we examine why markets may encourage or `require' banks or
other firms to hold certain capital ratios in the absence of regulatory capital re-
quirements.  Regulatory capital requirements will be considered later.  We follow
the tradition in the banking literature of referring to the capital ratio as the ratio of
equity to assets, although we will use other regulatory definitions below.
We begin by defining a bank's market capital `requirement' as the capital
ratio that maximizes the value of the bank in the absence of regulatory capital
requirements and all the regulatory mechanisms that are used to enforce them), but
in the presence of the rest of the regulatory structure that protects the safety and
soundness of banks.   This market `requirement', which may differ for each bank, is
2
the ratio toward which each bank would tend to move in the long run in the
absence of 
regulatory capital requirements.  This construct will be useful for examining
departures from the conditions under which M&M holds.  Note that unlike regu-4
      See Miller (1977) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) for detailed treatments of taxes.
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latory requirements, sanctions for departures from market capital `requirements'
are two-sided in the sense that the value of the bank will decline if it has  either too
little or too much capital.
The search for an optimal capital structure or market capital `requirement'
begins with the introduction of imperfections into the frictionless world of M&M. 
We will first consider taxes and costs of financial distress, followed by transactions
costs and asymmetric information problems.  These considerations apply quite
broadly to all firms.  We then consider an additional imperfection that is specific to
banks -- the regulatory safety net, defined more fully below.
Taxes and Financial Distress
Taxes and the costs of financial distress were the first majo r frictions considered
in determining optimal capital ratios.  Sinc e interest payments are tax deductible, but
dividends are not, substituting debt for equity enables firms to pass greater returns
to investors by reducing payments to the government.  Other things equal, owners
prefer to fund the firm almost entirely with debt.   But increasing leverage also
3
increases the risk of incurring the costs of financial distress (defined below).  The
expected costs of financial distress increase as the capital ratio declines and the
probability of insolvency rises.  The capital ratio at which the tax advantages of
additional debt are just offset by the increase in the ex pected costs of financial distress
determines the optimal capital structure or market capital `requirement' in the
presence of these two frictions.5
Financial distress occurs when  the bank is expected to have difficulty honoring
its commitments.  Costs of financial dist ress include the costs of bankruptcy -- i.e., the
costs of transferring ownership of the firm from shareholders to creditors.  Financial
distress costs also include the loss in value that may oc cur as a result of the perception
that bankruptcy may be imminent -- even if bankruptcy may ultimately be avoided.
Talented employees may leave, suppliers may demand more timely payments,
revenues from credit-risk-sen sitive products such as long-term swaps and guarantees
may decline, and conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors may lead to
suboptimal operating, investment, and financing decisions (discussed more fully
below).
Financial distress should be distinguished from economic distress.  The cost of
financial distress may be measured as  the additional loss from economic distress for
a leveraged bank versus an identical bank that is unleveraged.  When asset quality
deteriorates, both banks will experience economic distress, but the leveraged bank
experiences a greater loss of value because of the incre ased risk of bankruptcy, greater
uncertainty that the bank will honor its commitments to other stakeholders, and the
increasing costs of controlling conflicts of  interest between shareholders and creditors.
Research on the costs of financial and economic distress in banking illustrates
the difficulty of separating thes e two types of costs.  For example, James (1991) found
that in FDIC-administered bank failures, bank assets lost an average of 30% of book
value when sold, and the administrative and legal expenses associated with a failure
averaged another 10% of assets.  The 30% loss of book value from asset sales6
      Under ideal bankruptcy procedures, liquidation occurs only when the liquidation value
4
exceeds the value of the bank as a going concern.  Haugen and Senbet (1978) therefore
argued that liquidation costs should be regarded as a consequence of economic distress and
not as a cost of financial distress.
      Berger (1995) found empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.  He found a positive
5
relationship between capital ratios and earnings for U.S. banks during the 1980s, a period
when the probability of bank failure and the expected costs of financial distress raised market
capital `requirements'.  Banks that did not respond to these 'requirements' paid much higher
rates on their uninsured liabilities, which caused them to suffer lower earnings than other
exaggerates the cost of financial distre ss because part of the 30% undoubtedly reflects
economic distress incurred earlier, since the reported book values of assets at failed
banks often overstate economic value (see GAO 1990).  There is als o disagreement over
how much of the remaining costs of liquidating the individual assets should count as
financial versus economic distress costs.   Interestingly, losses to creditors (including
4
the FDIC) from bank insolvencies are often  less than losses from insolvencies of
nonbanking firms that go through the bankruptcy process, presumably because the
resolution process for banks is more efficient (Kaufman, 1994).
Part of the costs of financia l distress are borne by the bank's creditors and part
by shareholders.  To the extent that creditors can foresee the probability of incurring
these costs at the time that the debt is issued, they will  raise their required interest
rates and shift the entire expected costs of financial distress to shareholders under
risk neutrality.  In response, shareholders may choose to reduce these expected costs
by increasing the capital ratio of the bank to the point  at which the reduction in the
expected costs of financial distress just offsets the r eduction in the tax benefits of debt.
In effect, market capital `requirements' increase in response to a rise in the expected
costs of financial distress.
57
banks.
      Harris and Raviv (1991) surveyed more than one hundred papers on capital structure
6
theories, many of which assume some sort of asymmetric information.
Asymmetric Information and Transactions Costs
Relaxation of the M&M assumption of full information leads to a number of
additional reasons that capital ratios may matter.   The implications of asymmetric
6
information have been studied extensively in the banking literature because the
modern theory of financial intermediation stresses the information acquis ition function
of banks.  This theory (e.g., Diamond 19 84) implies that financial intermediaries exist
because they enjoy economies of scale and/or comparative advantages in th e production
of information about borrowers.  Commercial banks specialize in lending to informa-
tion-problematic borrowers, i.e., firms with idiosyncratic needs that are costly to
communicate, particularly small firms without established reputatio ns.  Banks acquire
information in the loan screening and contracting process, and then augment this
information over time by monitoring the borrower's loan repayments and deposit
activity.
The private information produced by banks  regarding their loan customers also
creates an asymmetric information problem for banks vis-a-vis financial markets.
Bank managers will generally have more information about their own earnings
prospects and financial condition than the capital markets.  Because of this opacity
(Ross 1989), the market  will draw inferences from the actions of the bank.  Managers
may signal information to the market through capital decisions.  If it is less costly for
a `good' bank to signal h igh quality through increased leverage than for a `bad' bank,8
      However, the 1980s data on U.S. banks was not consistent with the empirical implications
7
of either of these signaling hypotheses (Berger 1995).
      Shareholders may also be reluctant to issue more equity because it may transfer wealth
8
from old shareholders to old creditors if interest rates on outstanding debt cannot be easily
lowered to reflect the increased safety of the debt (Miller 1995).
a signaling equilibrium may exist in which banks that expect to have better future
performance have lower capital (Ross 1977).  Alternatively, a signaling equilibrium
may exist in which higher, rather  than lower capital signals favorable private infor-
mation (Acharya 1988).     
7
Asymmetric information combined with transactions costs of new issues may
also influence the relative costs of internal versus external finance and the relative
costs of debt versus equity.  When managers have significant private information,
shareholders may be reluctant to issue new equity because it may sell at a discount.
8
In addition, transactions costs in rais ing funds from external sources, particularly the
costs of issuing equity, may be quite substantial.  These costs include preparation of
the registration statement and prospectus, registration fees, printing and mailing
costs, underwriting fees, and possibly the cost of the issue being `underpriced' (e.g.,
Ibbotson et al 1988).  In contrast, banks typically have very low transactions costs in
issuing new debt in the form of deposits.  Banks may also hold a substantial buffer of
additional capital as financial slack so that they can borrow additional funds quickly
and cheaply in the event of unexpected profitable investment op portunities.  Similarly,
such a buffer of capital protects against costly unexpected shocks to capital if the
financial distress costs from low capital are substantial and the transactions costs of
raising new capital quickly are very high.  9
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that firms establish a pecki ng
order in developing their financing strategie s.  At the top of the pecking order is inter-
nally generated cash flows, which have no issue costs and no information problems.
If external funds are needed, debt is usually preferred to equity because its issuing
costs are usually lower, and because debt reduces verification costs (e.g., Townsend
1979).  All of these incentives may be accentuated  for small banks which typically face
very high transactions costs in issuing new equity.
Asymmetric information problems may also lead to agency conflicts between
shareholders and creditors that are exacerbated by conditions of financial distress.
Shareholders may find that actions which maximize the value of all clai ms on the bank
do not necessarily maximize the valu e of their own claims.  This may lead to attempts
to shift wealth from creditors to shareholders.  First, shareholders may have a moral
hazard opportunity to exploit creditors by substituting riskier assets for safer ones
(possibly undertaking negative net present valu e investments) if creditors do not have
sufficient information to react.  Second, when a bank is near defaul t, shareholders may
lack incentives to contribute new capital even to fund value-increasing investments,
since most of the benefits would accrue to cred itors (Myers 1977).  Third, shareholders
have incentives to continu e the bank's operations beyond the point at which it should
be liquidated in order to maintain at least an option value for their  claims.  Finally,
the bank may manipulate its accounts to mask the deterioration in condition by
understating loan losses or by `gains trading' in which assets with market values
above book values are sold and those with market values below book are kept (Carey10
1993).  These problems of expropriation of creditor value are compounded if the debt
has long maturity and is difficult to redeem in the short term.  This is because
shareholders are more likely to expropriate value  if there is more time before creditors
can react by raising rates or withdrawing credit (Flannery 1994).
   Similar to the arguments above for the other costs of financ ial distress, creditors
will demand compensation in the form of higher interest  rates on debt for the expected
value of these expropriations of their claims by  shareholders under risk neutrality.  In
response, banks may optimally increase their capital ratios t o assure creditors that the
bank is safe and shareholder and creditor interests are closely aligned, so that
shareholders are unlikely to engage in expropriation activities.  In effect, agency
problems between shareholders and creditors raise market capital `requirements'.
Other agency costs arise from a conflict of interest between shareholders and
managers when shareholders cannot effectively monitor managers' actions (J ensen and
Meckling 1976, Grossman and Hart 1982, Jensen 1986).  Higher  debt puts pressure
on managers to generate cash flows and avoid their loss of human capital from
bankruptcy and therefore may give incentives to work harder, reduce expense
preference behavior, and make better investment decisions.  Shareholders may also
compensate managers in shares and oblige them to hold the shares in  order to enhance
these incentives.  Given the managers' holdings, further increases in overall leverage
magnify the managers' stake in the bank's performance and may further heighten
these incentives.  In add ition, increasing debt reduces the scope for managers to keep
the firm going after the point at which shareholders would gain from liquidation11
      Regulators may also be concerned about the incentives shareholders provide managers. 
9
John et al (1995) argue below that a deposit insurance premium that reflects both leverage and
the structure of management compensation can lead banks to choose risk in accordance with
regulators' preferences.
(Harris and Raviv 1990).  Thus, sh areholder-manager agency conflicts are reduced by
increasing leverage.
9
Taken together, the agency problems between shareholders and creditors and
between shareholders and managers confront shareholders with a tradeoff.  Higher
capital avoids expropriation problems between shareholders and creditors but
aggravates conflicts of interest between shareholders and ma nagers, and vice versa for
lower capital.  Unfortunately, the corporate fina nce literature has made little progress
in quantifying this tradeoff, and so t he net impact on market capital `requirements' is
ambiguous.
The Safety Net
The departures from the M&M assumptions considered to this point -- taxes,
financial distress costs, asymmetric information, and transactions costs -- may
influence the capital dec isions of any firm.  Banks, however, differ substantially from
most other firms because they are protected by a regulatory safety net.  As will be
shown, this protection from bankruptcy  and the costs of financial distress will affect
market capital `requirements'.
We use the term `safety net' to refer to all government actions designed to
enhance the safety and soundness of the banking system other than the r egulation and
enforcement of capital requirements.  The safety net includes deposit insurance,12
      The insulation may be incomplete if depositors are concerned that the insurer may not
10
honor its commitments (e.g., Cook and Spellman 1994).
      The safety net may also reduce market capital requirements if it forces banks to take on
11
less portfolio risk than they otherwise would, since safer portfolios `require' less capital to
protect against financial distress costs.
unconditional payment guar antees, and access to the discount window, as well as the
entire panoply of regulation and supervision that is not directly related to capital.
Although capital regulation and its enforcement are also intended to enhance bank
safety, we want to consider how the safety net affects market capital `requirements'
in the absence of capital regulation.  The effects of regulatory cap ital requirements and
the motivations for both regulatory capital requirements and the safety net are
discussed below.
The safety net likely reduces market capital `r equirements' by insulating banks
from potential market discipline.  For example, federal deposit insurance insulates
banks from price and quantity reactions by insured depositors to bank capital deci-
sions.   This distortion could be eliminated if deposit insurance premiums fully
10
responded to changes in risk.  However, until recently, federal deposit insurance
premiums were fixed and they now respond only slightly to changes in  the capital ratio
(discussed below).  The safety net may also blunt the risk-pricing of  uninsured debt
if the market believes this debt to be de facto insured or if the safety net as a whole
acts as a subsidy to the bank, raising net cash flows.  These conditions would reduce
market capital `requirements' further.
11
In sum, our analysis suggests that several departures from the frictio nless world
of M&M may help explain market capital `requirements' for banks.  Tax co nsiderations13
      This figure reproduces and extends a figure developed by Myron Kwast in U.S. Treasury
12
(1991).  We are grateful to Myron for providing the data and sharing his insights.  Note that
these data are not fully consistent over time, and therefore should be used only to assess
general trends.
tend to reduce market capital `requirements', the expected costs of financial distress
tend to raise these `requirements', and transa ctions costs and asymmetric information
problems may either increase or reduce the capital held in equilibrium.  Finally, the
federal safety net shields bank creditors from the full consequenc es of bank risk taking
and thus tends to reduce market capital `requirements'.  This is consistent with the
fact that banks generally ha ve lower capital than firms in any other industry, includ-
ing financial institutions with similar portfolios that are not subject to the safety net
(e.g., commercial finance companies).  Additional support for this hypothesis may be
inferred from examining how the introduction of the safety net has influenced bank
capital ratios over time.
III. The Historical Evolution of Bank Capital Ratios in the U.S.
The history of bank capital ratios in the U.S. reveals a rema rkable, century-long
decline from the levels prior to the construction of the federal safety net.  Figure 1
shows the ratio of equity to assets for the banking industry from 1840 to 1993.   In
12
1840, equity funded over 50% of banks' ass ets, after which the ratio fell fairly steadily
for about 100 years until it settled in the 6% to 8% range from the mid-1940s to the
1990s.
Prior to the start of the National Banking era in 1863, capital ratios were
already declining significantly.  As the efficiency of the U. S. financial system improved
from geographic diversification, development of  regional and national money markets,14
and introduction of clearinghouses and other mutual guarantee associations, the
probability of bank failures declined.  In the framework described above,  this would
reduce market capital `requirements', because less capital was needed to protect
against the risk of financial distress.  The data are consistent with this hypothesis.
The four vertical lines in Figure 1 identify significant changes  in regulation that
may have altered the historical path of bank capital  ratios.  The National Banking Act
of 1863 contained regulations that bolstered confidence in the safety of the new
national banks.  These banks were required to deposit $10 in U.S. government bonds
with the Comptroller of the Currency for each $9 of national bank notes issued, thus
amply collateralizing the ne w currency.  This should have greatly reduced the capital
`required' by the holders of this bank debt, since  the safety of the notes did not depend
upon the solvency of the bank.  In principle, a `narrow' national bank could have had
a 10% capital/asset ratio by simp ly raising $9 in deposits for each dollar of equity and
buying only government bonds.  While this is a limiting case, the implicit 10%
regulatory capital ratio for such a bank was less than one-quarter of the average
capital ratio of the time.  The data show  an accelerated rate of decline of capital ratios
following 1863, consistent with the hypothesis that the Ac t reduced market capital `re-
quirements'.
The creation of the Federal Reserve in 1914 also reduced the risk  of bank failure
by permitting banks to obtain liquidity through discounting assets at the Federal
Reserve rather than incurring losses from the distress sale of assets to meet liquidity
needs.  The introduction of the Federal Reserve also enhanced liquidity by providing15
      We mark the implementation date as 1990, although some banks may have reacted to
13
announcements of RBC earlier.
a more reliable system for clearing checks at par.  Despite these reductions in the
expected costs of financial distress,  the data suggest that the creation of the Federal
Reserve led to, at most, a small reduction in capital ratios.
The creation of the FDIC in 1933 provided unconditional government
guarantees for most bank creditors.  The fixed -rate (non-risk-based) deposit insurance
lowered market capital `requirements' by guaranteeing depositors repayment even if
their bank failed.  Among other regulatory changes of the time, restrictions were
placed on the interest rates b anks could pay on deposits.  This provided an additional
subsidy to banking that also made uninsured bank debt safer,  reducing market capital
requirements further.  The data suggest that these changes had a larger and more
long-lasting effect than the creation of the Federal Reserve.  By the earl y 1940s, capital
had dropped into the 6% to 8% range where it remains  today.  Thus, after a century
of substantial decline, capital ratios remained relatively stable for the next half-
century.
The final event shown in Figure 1 is the initiation of the Basle Accord on risk-
based capital (RBC) requirements along with some other, near ly coincident, regulatory
changes.  RBC requirements were partially implemented in 1990 and took full effect
in 1992.   U.S. regulators also impo sed a leverage requirement in 1990 based on total
13
assets.  In 1991, the prompt corrective action feature of the FDIC Improvement Act
(FDICIA) created additional  motivation for banks to raise their capital ratios to avoid16
      See Jones and King (1995), Garcia (1995), and Kaufman (1995) below for discussions of
14
FDICIA, Szegö (1995) for discussion of RBC implementation in Europe, and Cummins et al.
(1995) for analysis of RBC and prompt corrective action in the insurance industry.
supervisory sanctions.   The introduction of risk-based deposit insurance premiums
14
in FDICIA added yet another incentive for ba nks to increase their capital ratios above
the new, higher, regulatory minimums.  The combined effect of these regulatory
actions appears to have been successful in raising capital ratios.  The aggregate
equity/asset ratio rose from 6.21% at the end of 1989 to 8.01% at the end of 1993, an
increase of almost 30% i n four years.  Although market `requirements' may also have
risen in the early 1990s because of concerns about financial distress in the banking
system, it seems plausible that the regulatory changes accounted for much of the
increase in capital ratios.
IV. Why Do Regulators Require Financial Institutions To Hold Capital?
In this section, we examine why cap ital ratios matter to bank regulators.  As in
the market capital `requirements' section above, we take as given the safety net of
government guarantees and regulations that protect the safety and soundness of
banks.
Regulators require capital for almost all  the same reasons that other uninsured
creditors of banks `require' capital -- to protect themselves against the  costs of financial
distress, agency problems, and the reduction i n market discipline caused by the safety
net.  The FDIC is effectively the largest uninsured creditor of most banks in the U.S.
because in the event of bank failure, it pays off the insured depositors and stands in
their place for a share of the failed bank's asse ts along with other uninsured creditors.17
The FDIC also bears many of the administrative costs when a bank fails.  Other
aspects of the safety net -- such as Federal Reserve discount window lending and
unconditional guarantees on FedWire payments -- create a dditional uninsured risk for
the government.  Regulators, as representatives of the F DIC, the Federal Reserve, and
the taxpayers who stand behind them, are vulnerable to the same costs of f inancial dis-
tress and expropriations of value as other creditors.  
Regulators also respond to other externalities associated with financial
intermediaries on behalf o f the rest of society.  The principal concern is systemic risk.
The failure of a large number of banks  or the failure of a small number of large banks
could set off a chain reaction that may undermine the  stability of the financial system.
Public information about the condition of individual banks is highly imperfect and so
when a number of banks fail, it may be  difficult to tell whether the cause is idiosyn-
cratic shocks to individual banks or a more widespread shock that jeopardizes many
other banks.  Thus, the news that some banks failed may create destructive `panic'
runs on other solvent, but illiquid banks by uninsured creditors who are unsure
whether the shock may affect their banks (Bhattacharya and Thakor  1993).  Interbank
markets may be another channel through which the problems of one bank are
transmitted rapidly to other banks since interbank transactions are large, variable,
and difficult for outsiders to monitor (Guttentag and Herring 1987).
These systemic problems can inflict heavy social costs.  Banks build up private
information on informationally opaque loan customer s through screening, contracting,
and monitoring over the course of bank-borrower relationships.  When a number of18
solvent but illiquid banks fail, the value of this information and the relationships
themselves may be lost, making it difficult for some borrowers to continue financing
investments.  In turn, this reduction in credit extended may exacerbate regional or
macroeconomic difficulties (Bernanke 1983).  Significant bank failures may also
threaten the integrity of the payments system, making it difficult for financial
resources to flow to where their returns are highest.  Moreover, widespread bank
failures could undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy.  According to the
`lending view', monetary policy operates largely through changing the qu antity of bank
loans, which would be difficult to control in a banking panic (Bernanke  and Blinder
1992).  Concern about these social costs from a systemic crisis may lead regulators to
attempt to achieve a higher degree of safety for banks by requiring higher capital
ratios than if they were acting solely to protect the gove rnment's position as uninsured
creditor.  Note that concern about systemic  risk is not only a motivation for regulatory
capital requirements, but is also a major motivation behind the safety net itself.
Not all observers agree that systemic risk is an important issue (e.g. Benston
and Kaufman, 1995).  In the absence of systemic risk or other significant negative
externalities from bank failures, the government should behave, in principle, like a
private-sector uninsured creditor.  The government should price risk through deposit
insurance premiums and set capital standards and closure rules similar to covenants
contained in standard debt contracts (e.g., Black et al 1978, Acharya and Dreyfus
1989).
Despite the fact that the government is th e largest uninsured creditor of banks,19
it does not exercise market dis cipline and `require' capital in the same way that other
uninsured creditors do.  First, it relies very little on explicit risk pricing.  FDIC
insurance premiums were not tied to risk until recently, and the current differential
for risk is very small.  As of 1994, ba nks with the best examination ratings (composite
CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2) that were also well  capitalized (at least 10% total risk-based
capital ratio, 6% Tier 1 ratio, and 5% Tier 1 leverage ratio ) paid 23 basis points of total
deposits (23 cents per $100 of deposits).  In contrast, banks with the  worst examination
ratings (CAMEL 4 or 5) that were undercapitalized (less than 8% total ratio, 4% Tier
1 ratio, or 4% Tier 1 leverage ratio) paid 31 basis points.  This maximum price
difference of 8 basis points for risk is far below the differential that would be charged
in the debt markets for such la rge differences in risk (e.g., the differential between B-
rated and AAA-rated bonds is typically well over 100 basis points). 
The 8-basis-point differe ntial is also far less than the differences in actuarially
fair insurance premiums estimated from opt ion pricing models.  For example, Kuester
and O'Brien (1990) estimated that fair premiums for most firms would be v ery low, less
than 1 basis point, while a few very risky outliers had fair premia in  the 1000's of basis
points.  While this approach requires  a number of simplifying assumptions, the result
that most banks are very safe and a few banks are extremely risky is consistent with
the rest of this literature (e.g., Ronn and Verma 1986), and suggests that the 8-basis-
point maximum FDIC differential does not capture the existing risk differences.
Moreover, it is not clear that this small price differential would by itself be a critical
factor in deterring banks from holding low  capital ratios.   Since the FDIC does so lit-
1520
      The 8 basis point differential is an upper bound to the additional cost to the bank, because
15
banks can reduce also premiums by shifting from deposit to non-deposit funding, by shifting
assets into lower risk-weighted categories, or by shrinking the size of the bank.  At the upper
bound, the 8 basis points
would reduce return on assets (ROA) by about 5 or 6 basis points pre-tax (assuming deposits
fund about 60-80% of deposits), or by about 3 or 4 basis points after-tax.
      Note that when banks have private information about their portfolio risks, it may be
16
undesirable or even impossible for regulators to price the expected costs of risk on an
actuarially fair basis.  In order to reduce moral hazard incentives, it may be desirable to
provide a subsidy to banks that increases their franchise values and improves their incentives
to keep their risks under control (Buser et al 1981, Chan et al 1992).
tle pricing of risk, it must re ly more on capital requirements than the private sector.
16
Also, regulators usually do not ration their credit -- i.e ., deposit insurance cover-
age -- to limit their risks as market participants do.  Markets routinely  refuse to extend
additional credit to a bank or other firm if the going interest rate does not cover the
risk and raising the interest rate would create moral hazard or adverse selection
problems.  In contrast, regulators generally do not explicitly ration deposit insurance
coverage.  In most cases, the FDIC's insurance liability is simply determined by the
demand and supply for the  individual bank's insured deposits.  Similarly to the weak
pricing response, the fact that regulators usually do not ration credit increases their
reliance on capital regulation.
Regulators do have some indirect means of pressuring banks to raise capital
ratios, such as cease-and-desist orders, total withdrawal of insurance coverage, bank
closure, limits on asset growth and brokered deposits, prohibition of dividend
payments, etc. (Buser et al 1981).  However, these tools are blunt, unc ertain, and apply
to only a small percentage of institutions.  One of the purposes of t he prompt correction
action feature of FDICIA was to improve capital-based incentives by making some of21
      Kwan and Eisenbeis (1995) below provide evidence that cost-inefficient banks take
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greater risks to exploit the safety net than other banks because they have lower market values
these regulatory actions mandatory wh en the capital ratios fell into designated zones.
Nonetheless, Jones and King's (1995) evidence below suggests that the mandatory
actions are not likely to apply very often to the banks that ar e undertaking substantial
risks.
In addition, there is the possibility that these blunt actions could create
additional moral hazard incentives to take advantage of the safety net.  For example,
the deposit insurer could suffer increased expected losses  from raising the capital ratio
at which banks are closed because some banks may take hi gher risks and suffer larger
losses before the insurer can detect them (Herring and Vankudre 1987, Davies and
McManus 1991).  This is because the capital ratio at which  moral hazard incentives
become important depen ds more on how far the capital ratio is from the closure point
than on the absolute level of the capital ratio.  Similar increases in risk-taking could
be forthcoming in response to other costly interventions by regulators.
Thus, regulatory capital requirements differ substantially from market-based
capital `requirements'.  They are generally blunt standards that respond only
minimally to perceived differences in risk rather than the continuous prices and
quantity limits set by uninsured creditors in response to changing perceptions of the
risk of individual banks.  The limited ability to price or ration  the benefits of the safety
net in response to changes in bank risk  may be quite costly if it permits risky banks
to take advantage of the safety net by choosing lower  capital ratios than the market
would require them to hold in the absence of the safety net.
17,1822
and higher costs of capital.
      Ironically, regulators may have an informational advantage in pricing risk and/or setting
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capital requirements because of access to confidential bank examination information (Berger
and Davies, 1994).  
V. How Should Regulatory Capital Standards Be Set?
Capital regulation is motivated in part by concern over the negative
externalities that may result from bank default that are not taken into account in
market capital `requirements'.  One obvious regulatory remedy would be to require
banks to hold so much equity that the probability of default is negligible.   Indeed, if the
M&M proposition applied to banks this would be a costless solution.  B ut if, as we have
argued, increasing equity beyond the market `requirement' reduces the value of the
bank and increases its weighted average cost of financing, then higher regulatory re-
quirements may impose social costs.  In competitive markets in the long run,
regulatory capital costs are likely to be passed on to bank customers, so that the size
of the banking industry and the quantity of intermediation may be reduced.  Thus,
capital regulation involves a tradeoff between the marginal social benefit of reducing
the risk of the negative externalities from bank failures and the marginal social cost
of diminishing intermediation (Santomero and Watson 1977).
These social costs and benefits from regulatory capital requirements differ
across banks and over time.  `Ideal' regulatory capital requirements wo uld reflect these
differences to equate the marginal social cost of higher capital  with the marginal social
benefit for each bank for each time period.  For example, a bank that poses no
significant externalities would be assigned  a relatively low capital requirement that23
reflects only the government's claim as an uninsured creditor.   In contrast, a bank that
is likely to transmit shocks to other banks because of key ro les in the payments system
and interbank markets would be subject  to a high capital requirement.  Similarly, the
requirements would be continuously updated with changes in the risk p ositions of each
bank and the external costs of these risks.
Unfortunately, implementation of such an  `ideal' system would be prohibitively
expensive, if not impossible.  Regulators lack precise estimates of social costs and
benefits to tailor a capital requirement for each bank, and cannot easily revise the
requirements continuously as conditi ons change.  Because regulation and supervision
are costly, banks are monitored at only at discrete intervals.  Under FDICIA, most
banks receive full scope, on-site examinations only once annually.
In practice, capital regulation  stipulates uniform, minimum ratios below which
banks are subject to regulatory sanctions, and these minimums remain relatively
stable over a period of years.  Between on-site examinations, compliance with these
minimums can be easily monitored by inspection of the quarterly Call Report.
Regulators also have discretion to set somewhat higher requirements for individual
banks that are perceived to pose higher risks.
In the remainder of this section, we examine how regulatory minimum capital
standards might be set, given these constraints.  We explore which financial
instruments should count as regulatory capital and how the numerator and
denominator of the regulatory capital ratio should be  measured.  We also discuss some
policy alternatives to improve the effectiveness of capital regulation.24
      Relative to debt instruments that may be considered as regulatory capital, equity has the
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additional benefit that it absorbs losses before the point of bankruptcy and permits the bank to
continue as a going concern.  This property is important to the extent that shareholders would
have difficulty raising new equity to avert bankruptcy even when the bank has positive value
as a going concern.
What Should Count as Regulatory Capital?
The main regulatory policy goals of protecting the government's uninsured
claims on banks and guarding against the external costs of bank failure such as
systemic risk suggest that instruments th at qualify as  regulatory capital should have
three main characteristics.  First, claims that qualify as regulatory capital should be
junior to those of the deposit insurer, so that they serve as a buffer to absorb losses
before the government.  Second, a financial instrument that counts as capital should
be `patient money'.  It should not be redeemable without assured refunding by the
same or other creditors or shareholders during the time period needed to evaluate a
significant shock so that it can provide a stable sour ce of funds during a possible panic
run on the bank by other creditors.  This reduces the potential for, and scope of
contagious bank runs and allow s regulators more time to evaluate and respond to the
shock.  Finally, an instrument that counts as regulatory capital should reduce the
bank's moral hazard incentives to exploit the protection of the safety net by under-
taking excessive portfolio or leverage risk.
We consider next the extent to which equity meets these three criteria for
regulatory capital.  Equity is junior to all other  claims and thus serves well as a buffer
against loss for the deposit insurer.   It also has an indefinitely long maturity and
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cannot be redeemed during a crisis period.  Regulators typically prohibit  excessive divi-25
dend payouts or stock repurchases for distressed banks, so that equity serves well as
a stable source of funds while regulators and market participants sort through the
effects of shocks.  However, equity may not always achieve the third objective of
disciplining risk taking.  Regulatory requirements to increase equity-to-asset ratios
reduce leverage risk, but the effect on portfolio risk and on the overall risk of
bankruptcy is ambiguous in some circumstances.
Koehn and Santomero (1980), Keeton (1988), and Kim and Santomero (1988)
used utility maximization models to show that an increase in the required equity-to-
asset ratio might either increase or decrease the portfolio risk chosen by a bank.  If
equity is relatively expensive (for reasons discussed above), risk-averse bank owners
may choose to take part of their loss from a higher equity requirement in the form of
an increase in risk by choosing a hi gher point on the risk-expected return frontier.  In
effect, they may respond to a forced reduction in leverage risk that lowers expected
return by choosing a portfolio with higher risk and higher expected return.  In
contrast, Furlong and Keeley (1989)  and Keeley and Furlong (1990) found that value-
maximizing banks with publicly traded stock will always reduce portfolio risk in
response to a higher equity requireme nt because it increases the share of losses borne
by the bank owners relative to the FDIC.  However, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) found
that value-maximizing banks may increase portfol io risk and the probability of failure
if bank investments are subject to decreasing returns to investment, as may  be the case
for the type of information-intensive, non-ma rketable loans in which banks specialize.
 Even with an increase in the probability of failure , however, Gennotte and Pyle found26
that the expected cost to the deposit insurer generally decreased in response to an
increase in required equity because the size of the insurer loss decreased
proportionately more than the increase in the probability of failure.  Fina lly, Avery and
Berger (1991b) showed that expected losses fo r the insurer could rise from an increase
in required equity in the Gennotte and Pyle model, but some extreme distributional
assumptions about investment returns were needed.  Thus, the theoretical  issue of how
higher required equity ratios affect bank risk-taking is unresolved.
In contrast, the empirical evidence generally suggests that higher equity is
associated with lower overall bank risk.  Vi rtually every bank failure model finds that
a higher equity-to-asset ratio is associated with a lower future probability of failure
(e.g., Lane et al 1986, Avery and Berger 1991b, Cole  and Gunther 1995).  Nonetheless,
the relationship between the equity-to-asset ratio and bank safety is often relatively
weak.  A higher equity ratio does not always  predict a lower probability of failure over
all reasonably near future periods (Thomson 1991), and often expla ins very little of the
variation in bank performance.
This is an important area for future research.  We lack clear evidence about
whether the positive (albeit weak) relationship between equity and bank  safety reflects
a decrease in portfolio risk in addition to the decline in leverage risk.  Also the extent
to which the empirical results reflect the effects of regulatory versus market capital
`requirements' is not always clear.
We next consider subordinated debt, which is often included in regulatory
capital.  Subordinated debt is junior to all claims other than equity  and so serves as27
      In the interest of brevity, this discussion ignores hybrid instruments such as perpetual,
20
noncumulative floating rate notes that have some of the characteristics of equity.  We also
neglect several other items that count as regulatory capital under the Basle Accord.
      To qualify as Tier 2 capital under the Basle Accord, subordinated debt must have original
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weighted average maturity of at least 5 years, and the amount that counts as capital is reduced
over the last 5 years of term.
a buffer against losses by the deposit insurer.   Subordinated debt is also generally
20
`patient money' that helps provide stable funds to weather shocks to confidence.  It
typically has a long maturity and is difficult to red eem quickly during a crisis period.
21
Although subordinated debt increases leverage  risk, it may deter portfolio risk taking.
Subordinated creditors have strong incentives to  monitor bank risk taking and impose
discipline -- provided they believe that they will not be protected by the safety net.
Indeed, their loss exposure, and hence their perspective is simil ar to that of the deposit
insurer.  They are exposed to downside  risk that exceeds the shareholders' equity, but
their potential upside gains are contractually limited.   In contrast to shareholders who
may choose higher points  on the risk-expected return frontier, subordinated creditors
generally prefer safer portfolios and are likely to penalize banks that take significant
risks.
The price discipline of actively traded subordinated debt -- which is registered
moment-by-moment in seco ndary market prices that can move by small fractions -- is
arguably a much quicker and perhaps more precise way of controlling  bank risk taking
than regulatory measures which ar e often blunt and cumbersome to deploy.  A falling
price of subordinated debt  can alert other creditors about the condition of the bank or28
      In addition, market prices tend to be more forward looking than regulatory examinations,
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and may provide regulators with valuable information on the market's perceptions of the risks
taken by banks (Horvitz 1983).
actions of the managers, creating a broader market reaction.   Ironically, when bank
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risk increases unexpectedly, banks may not have to pay higher rates or face possible
quantity discipline for a period of time until the subordinated debt , which typically has
a long maturity, must be redeemed.  For this reason, it may be useful to have some
regular turnover of subordinated debt, even though it weakens the role of  subordinated
debt as `patient money'.  For example, if banks were required  to stagger the maturities
of their long-term debt so that only a modes t proportion turned over each period, price
and quantity sanctions may be effective and informative, but sufficiently limited in
magnitude to provide time for crisis resolution or orderly closure (Wall 1989, Evanoff
1991).
Despite the theoretical virtues of subordinated debt, the literature on market
discipline usually found that the price of  subordinated debt was not very responsive
to measures of bank risk t aking in the early 1980s (e.g., Avery et al 1988, Gorton and
Santomero 1990).  The price reaction to balance sheet measures of risk was quite
limited, although the response was somewhat great er to changes in bond ratings.  The
weak responses to measured risk may reflect a lack  of market discipline, but they may
also reflect difficulties in measuring bank risk.  Moreover, the limited responsiveness
may also reflect a presumption by investors that the large banks that issued
subordinated debt in the early 1980s were considered to be `too big to fail' .  More recent
results suggest that subordinated debt prices may have  become more sensitive to bank29
risk, perhaps reflecting increases over time in the willingness of regulators to let
holders of this type of debt absorb losses (Flannery and Soresca, 1994).  FDICIA's
emphasis on early closure and least cost  resolution may undermine the `too big to fail'
presumption even further, but additional resea rch will be needed to resolve this issue.
Finally, we consider the potential of uninsured deposits as regulatory capital.
Uninsured depositors in domestic bank offices have claims of equal status to the
deposit insurer, rather than providing a buffer that absorbs losses before the
government.  However, uninsured deposits in fo reign offices of U.S. banks do have the
advantage of being junior claims to the FDIC.  The Budget Act of 1993 provides for
U.S. depositor preference in the  event of bank failure, so that uninsured depositors in
U.S. banking offices and the FDIC (which stands in the place of insured  depositors) are
senior claimants over depositors in foreign offices  and all other creditors.  Empirical
studies usually found that bank risk affects uninsured deposit  rates, but the effect was
typically weaker for banks that may be `too big to fail,' similar to the results for
subordinated debt (Hannan and Hanweck 1988, Ellis and Flannery 1992).  However,
uninsured deposits are not `patient  money' that provides a stable source of funding in
a crisis.  Depositors can usually `run'  and deposits can be redeemed for cash quickly
when concerns arise abou t the solvency of an institution, possibly leading to systemic
risk problems.  For example, the devasta ting run on Continental Illinois bank in 1984
was initiated by uninsured foreign depositors.  Because of this problem, uninsured
deposits are not counted as regulatory capital.
In sum, equity and subordinated debt  broadly satisfy the criteria for regulatory30
capital, but uninsured deposits do not.  Both equity and subordinated debt are junior
to the deposit insurer and provide buffers against government losses.  Both instru-
ments are also `patient money' that is usually difficult to redeem during a financial
crisis, mitigating systemic risk problems and buying time for regulators to deal with
the crisis.  Both equity and subordinated debt likely reduce bank risk taking some-
what, but the theoretical and empirical evidence is much weaker on this point.
Measurement of Regulatory Capital
In order to be useful, regulatory capital must be measured with reasonable
accuracy.  However, this is seldom a simple task.  For example, equity capital  is the
residual claim on the bank -- the value of obligations of others  to pay the bank plus the
value of any other tangible and intangible assets less the value of obligations of the
bank to pay others.  Therefore, meas urement of equity depends on how  all of a bank's
financial instruments and other assets are valued.
If all claims were traded in complete, well-organized secondary markets, the
measurement of equity capital for regulatory p urposes would be relatively straightfor-
ward.  It could be calculated as the `regulatory value of equity' -- the difference
between the market value of the bank's assets (on and off the balance sheet) and the
market value of the bank's liabilities (on and off the balance sheet), net  of the value
of limited liability (which includes the value of access to deposit insurance).  That is,
the market values of all liabilities would be adjusted as if the shareholders had to
repay all the bank's obligations, even in the event of failure.  This measure is the
amount of value that could be lost before any  of the bank's obligations to pay would go31
      This definition may somewhat understate the economic value of capital because part of
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the limited liability is voluntarily absorbed by uninsured creditors and paid for by
shareholders through higher interest rates.
unsatisfied.   The possible alternative of using the bank's market value of equity is
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unsuitable for regulatory  purposes because it contains the value of the bank's limited
liability, its option to put the bank's assets to its creditors .  Since the FDIC bears much
of the cost when this option is exercised, regulators should not count the value of the
option as part of regulatory capital.
This `regulatory value of equity' -- assuming that sufficient market price in-
formation is available to compute it -- is also superior to the book value of equity
typically used by regulators.  The book value of equity measures  most on-balance sheet
assets and liabilities on an historical cost basis that may not reflect cur rent values, and
treats most off-balance sheet items as having zero value.  The book v alue measure does
not reflect the bank's ability to withstand a loss without imposing costs on creditors,
nor does it reflect the constraint on moral hazard.  Moreover, as noted above, book
values are subject to `gains trading' by banks to increase their r eported capital without
creating value.
Unfortunately, not all of the bank's assets and liabilities are traded on well-
organized secondary markets.  The most difficult obstacle to computing the economic
value of equity is the substantial volume of imperfectly marketable assets held by
banks.  As discussed above, banks specialize in making loans to and providing
guarantees for information-problematic borrowers.  Although banks have made
substantial advances in securitizat ion, it is often difficult to overcome the asymmetric32
information problem.  When this problem is acute,  the market breaks down because
no buyer is willing to pay a price equal to the value of the asset to the bank based on
its private information. 
Several studies (e.g., Benston et al 1986) have recommended that banks adopt
market value accounting (MVA), in which th e reported values on financial statements
-- and therefore measured capital -- would reflect market values.  Virtually all of the
MVA proposals advocate  marking-to-market financial instruments that are traded in
well-organized secondary markets with easily observable  prices.  Many also propose
that estimates of market values be reported for nontraded assets, such as loans to
small borrowers that do not have access to financial markets.  This creates the
conceptual problem of how  to define the market value of an essentially unmarketable
asset, such as a loan to small borrower unknown to the public.  Although there are a
number of possible implicit values that could be assigned  to such a loan, the private
nature of the information used would create a difficult verification problem for
regulators and auditors (Berger et al 1991).
Accountants and bank regulators have also initiated moves toward MVA and
disclosures of market values as supplementary information on financial statements.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued several proposals.  FAS 107
required disclosures of `fair values' for all financial instruments as supplementary
information starting in 1992 for large firms and in 1995 for small firms.  Disclosures
do not affect reported income or capital, but  part of the purpose was to make available
information that may be used to facilitate a future movement toward MVA.  FDICIA33
similarly requires disclosures of estimated market values in Call Reports and other
documents filed with regulatory agencies.  FAS 115 implemented a form of `partial
market value accounting' in 1994, in which securities that are `available for sale' are
marked to market on the balance sheet, affecting measured equity  capital.  There is
no accounting change for other a ssets or for liabilities, and income statements are not
affected, so that the change in retained earnings is not reported as income.  Bank
regulators have chosen not to implement this cha nge in calculating regulatory capital.
Despite all this academic and regulatory attention, however, there has been
relatively little empirical evidence on the effects of  MVA.  Three of the papers below
advance this line of research.  Carey (1995) examines the likely effects of a version of
securities-only partial MVA (SOPMVA) similar to FAS 115 in which only tradeable
securities are marked-to-market, while other assets a nd liabilities remain at historical
cost.  He finds that this change could slightly improve the system by  measuring one
group of assets more accurately and by reducing wasteful `gains trading' be havior.  But
SOPMVA may also make measured capital  less accurate if tradeable securities  function
as a hedge against interest rate  risk created by a duration mismatch elsewhere in the
portfolio.  If the hedge position is marked to market, but the underlying exposure is
not, SOPMVA may also create artificial volatility in the measured capital of a bank
that has a matched book on a  full MVA basis.  Carey's analysis suggests, however,
that SOPMVA would have little effect on bank failure rates.
Barth et al (1995) examine the validity of common criticisms of MVA by
analyzing the empirical effects of SOPMVA on ban k income, capital, and stock market34
values.  This is also similar to FAS 115, although as noted, FAS 115 does not affect
reported income.  They find that  SOPMVA does raise the volatility of reported earn-
ings, but that bank share prices do not reflect this extra volatility.  SOPMVA would
also increase the number of violations of regulatory capital standards, which may
distort behavior if banks use securities to hedge interest rate risk elsewhere in the
portfolio that is not marked-to-market.  Barth et al's finding that the stock market
generally does not react to the volatility in the earnings on sec urities is consistent with
the possibility that these securities often do hedge risk elsewhere in the portfolio.
Jones and King (1995) test an alternative approach to MVA for adju sting capital
to reflect changes in the credit quality  of the loan portfolio.  Instead of adjusting the
values of individual loans to reflect changes in the creditworthiness of borrowers --
which poses numerous problems for loa ns to informationally opaque borrowers -- they
adjust the loan loss reserve account to reflect changes in the credit condition of the
bank's entire loan portfolio.  This has the same effect on reported equity capital as
reductions in individual loan values.  Berger et al (1991)  earlier showed that adjusting
loan loss reserves to reflect nonperforming loans (past due, nonaccrual, or
renegotiated) improved the  prediction of future loan charge-offs and could potentially
make risk-based capital significantly more accurate.   Jones and King (1995) show that
adjusting loan loss reserves to reflect classified assets -- assets categorized by  bank
examiners as substandard, doubtful, or loss -- does an even better job of capturing
declines in credit quality.  Moreover, a simulation of  the prompt corrective action rules
of FDICIA using data from the 1980s suggested that this adjustment to  capital may35
significantly improve the tradeoff between Type 1 errors (troubled banks not being
categorized as undercapitalized) and Type 2 errors (healthy banks being categorized
as undercapitalized).
Thus, the implementation of SOPMVA  is unlikely to improve the measurement
of capital  significantly.  However, a form of partial MVA in which  all financial
instruments -- including off-balance sheet instruments and informationally opaque
loans -- are adjusted for changes in market interest rates and foreign exchange rates
could result in significantly better measurement of capital.  Movement toward full
MVA or an approximation to it awaits future research on the problem of adjusting
values for changes in credit quality of information-problematic borrowers along the
lines of Berger et al (1991) and Jones and King (1995).
How Should the Capital Ratio Denominator Be Measured?
The measurement of capital for the numerator of the capital ratios is only half
of the problem, indeed, perhaps the easier half.  Capital adequa cy depends on the ratio
of capital to the risk it should be prepared to absorb.  Thus, the denominator of a
regulatory risk-based capital ratio should measure the bank's risk exposure, or the
variability of a bank's net worth.  There is disagreement over which measure of net
worth is most appropriate, but we prefer the `regulatory value of equity' measure
described above -- the market values of  all assets less the values of liabilities adjusted
for limited liability.  The greater the variability, the higher capital must be to protect
against the social costs of bankruptcy.
In practice, however, it is difficult to develop an accurate measure of risk36
      The Basle Committee also proposed a procedure for taking market risk into account and
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guidelines for measuring exposure to interest rate risk. To date, U.S. regulators have been
unable to agree on a procedure for incorporating concentration risk and interest rate risk in the
requirements.  However, the European Union has already incorporated market risk into its
capital requirements (Szegö 1995).
exposure that is reasonably simple and can be uniformly applied  across banks.  The
Basle Accord's risk-weighted assets denominator (RWA) focuses on credit risk,
reflecting the perception that credit risk poses the most serious threat to bank
solvency.  Other types of risk are  to be incorporated later.   All assets and off-balance
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sheet instruments are assigned risk weights of 0%, 20%, 50%, or 100%, depending on
the group to which the obl igor belongs and the type of financial instrument.  The risk
weights do not reflect some  obvious determinants of credit risk, such as differences in
credit quality across commercial loans (all of which are in the 100% category),
concentrations of risk in a specific asset category or to a particular obligor, industry,
or region, and covariances among the values of financial instruments.
Several empirical studies have analyzed the correspondence o f RWA with actual
risk.  Avery and Berger (1991b) and Bradley et al (1991) found that RWA for banks
and thrifts, respectively, was positively related to the probability of failure and some
accounting measures of  risk, but these relationships were fairly weak.  Moreover, the
relative risk weights in RWA were often out of alignment with actual risk.
Cordell and King (1995) below obtain similar results, but use an entirely
different methodology.  They app ly option pricing methods to market data on publicly
traded banks and thrifts to measure their risks, making several technical improve-
ments to this literature.  After measuring the value of the deposit insuranc e put option,37
they determine the capital ratio for each institution needed so  that the value of the put
option equals the existing flat-rate deposit insurance  premium prevailing at that time.
They find numerous problems with the relative risk weights for both ba nks and thrifts,
and also conclude that acco unting measures of capital may overstate the actual value
of capital that is available to absorb losses.
Jones and King (1995) below show that RWA can be imp roved by increasing the
risk weights on assets that are classified as substandard, doubtful, or loss by bank
examiners.  Greater quantities of classified assets incre ase the variance of future bank
losses as well as raising the expected value of future losses.  Thus, by giving more
weight to classified assets, a modified RWA is likely to be closer to our ideal denomi-
nator -- the variability of net worth.  Their simulation of the effects of the prompt
corrective action rules of FDICIA described above yielded an even better tradeoff
between Type 1 and Type 2 errors when the RWA capital ratio denominator was
modified to give higher weights to classified assets.  That is, the policy tradeoff was
improved more than when just the capital numerator was adjusted to take classified
assets into account.
Another potential problem with any regulatory measure of risk exposure used
as a denominator is that it may be subject to manipulation by bank management.
Banks may be able to restructure their transactions to reduce their capital
requirements without reducing their actual risk exposures.  Merton (1995) below
provides an example of how the current RWA denominator can be circumvented -- in
place of a portfolio of mortgages,  a bank can hold the economic equivalent of the same38
portfolio at a risk weight one-eighth as large.  The extent of  such manipulation that
has taken place since impleme ntation of RBC is an open question for future research.
Thus, the denominator of the Basle Accord RBC capital ratio appears to reflect
the variability of net worth or the economic value of equity quite imperfectly.  Re-
searchers have suggested some practical ways to improve  the denominator.  But the
more fundamental problem, as Merton (1995) argues below, is that we need  a new kind
of `risk accounting' focused on  exposures rather than values, that would capture how
values are likely to change in response to changes in the underlying environment.
Alternatives to a Simple Risk-Based Capital Ratio
The foregoing discussion implies that a simple risk-based capital ratio is a
relatively blunt tool for controlling bank risk-taking.  The capital in the numerator
may not always control bank moral hazard incentives, it  is difficult to measure, and
its measured value may be subject to manipulation by `gains trading'.  The risk
exposure in the denominator is also difficult to measure, corresponds only weakly to
actual risks, and may be subject to significant manipulation.  These imprecisions
worsen the social tradeoff between the externalities from bank failures and the
quantity of bank intermediation.  To keep bank risk to a tolerable level, capital
standards must be higher on average than they otherwise would be i f the capital ratios
could be set more precisely, rai sing bank costs and reducing the amount of intermedi-
ation in the economy in the long run.
 A way to resolve these problems at least partially is to have multiple capital
ratios.  For example, it may be desirable to have a minimum standard with equity in39
the numerator and a separate standard with subordinated debt in the numerator
because each has different benefits and deficiencies.  This is similar to the current
Basle Accord standards, which have minimums for Tier 1 capital (which contains
equity) and Total capital (which contains both equity and subordinated debt).  Avery
and Berger's (1991b) analysis suggested the both of these ratios had ind ependent value
in capturing risks.  Analogously, an additional denominat or may catch some risks that
are otherwise missed by the risk-based denominator and make it more difficult to
manipulate the system.  The leverage requirement for U.S. banks, which requires a
minimum amount of capital  per unit of unweighted assets, may be viewed as such a
response to problems with the risk-based rat ios.  Avery and Berger's (1991b) data also
suggested that the addition of the leverag e requirement would improve the correspon-
dence between risk and the regulatory capital standards, provided that this
requirement is set high enough to be binding.  However, the leverage requirement is
imperfect as well.  Merton (1995) shows that the same transaction can be financed in
two different ways that lead to strikingly different leverage rati os, but do not affect the
net worth or risk of the bank.  Moreo ver, if the ratio is set too high, the extent of bank
intermediation may be inappropriately constrained.
Kane (1995) below argues that regulatory capital requirements are an ineffi cient
means of controlling the government's risk as uninsured creditor because regulators
do not limit risk exposure as rigorously as private entities would.  The weaker the
ability of regulators to identify, measure, and control risk-taking by depository
institutions, the more burdensome capital requirements must be i n order to protect the40
       See Litan (1987), Pierce (1991), and Szegö (1994) for extended analysis of the narrow
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bank.  
government's claim as uninsured creditor.  Kane contends that the same degree of
protection could be attained at lower cost by making greater use of transparency and
other loss control mechanisms in addition to capital requirements.  He advocates
privatizing some of the monitoring and disciplinary activi ties traditionally undertaken
by government through making broader use of risk-sharing contracts -- not only
subordinated debt as above, but also collat eralization, coinsurance, and reinsurance --
to enlist the greater accountability and quicker responsiveness of private entities in
controlling bank risk taking.
Miller (1995) below advocates scrapping capital requirements and official
surveillance of risk in favor of a `narrow bank' in which insured deposits must be
invested only in short-term Treasury bills or close equivalents.   Banks would also
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issue non-guaranteed securities to fund conventional bank loans, just as finance
companies and leasing companies now do.  Alternatively, most of the benefits of the
transparency and simplicity of this approach could be maintained while allowing
greater flexibility in portfolio choice if bank s are permitted to hold not only short-term
Treasuries, but also other assets that are regularly traded on well-organized markets
and can be marked to market daily.  This could be implemented in two ways which
differ according to whether or not insured deposits are kept in a separate legal entity
of a diversified banking corporation: 1) the `secure depository' approach, in which
institutions would be required to form  separately incorporated entities taking insured
deposits and holding only permiss ible, marketable assets; or (2) the `secured deposits'41
approach, in which insured deposits secured by a lien on a pool of permissible assets
would be in a corporate entity holding other assets  and liabilities (Benston et al 1989).
Capital requirements for the `secure depository' (or the analogous excess collateral
requirements for `secured deposits') would be set to insure that the chance of
insolvency between daily mark-to-market points is reduced to some minimal
probability with very low expected losses.  These approaches share with Kane's
proposal an emphasis on greater reliance on private sector mechan isms for identifying,
measuring, and monitoring risk-taking by banks -- in effect, greater relia nce on market
capital `requirements' rather than regulatory capital requirements.
VI. Unintended Consequences of Regulatory Capital Requirements
Since actual capital standards are, at best, an approximation to the ideal, it
should not be surprising that they may ha ve had some unintended effects.  Earlier we
noted that in response to an increase in its required equity-to-asse t ratio, a bank might
increase its portfolio risk and raise its probability of failure.  Risk-based capital
requirements that penalize increases in portfolio risk can reduce such unintended
consequences of capital requirements, but as we have seen, these standards are
imprecise, leaving open the possibility that some banks may increase portfolio risks
when capital standards are raised.  Moreover, imperfections in setting the level of
required capital and the relative risk weights may lead to allocative inefficiencies if
capital requirements distort relative prices bo th among banks and between banks and
non-bank competitors, and divert fin ancial resources from their most productive uses.
In this section, we focus on two specific areas in which regulatory capital42
requirements may have had unintended effects on bank portfolio risk and/or created
allocative inefficiencies.  These are (1) the explosive growth of securitization in the
1980s, and (2) the so-called `cred it crunch' or reduction in commercial lending by U.S.
banks in the early 1990s.  Changes in regulatory ca pital requirements have been cited
in the trade press and academic literature as major factors behind both of these
developments.  Before turning to these two issues, however, we discuss a necessary
condition for regulatory capital requirements to have  any consequences -- that they be
binding.
Are Regulatory Capital Requirements Binding?
Regulatory capital requirements matter only to the extent that they effectively
constrain a significant portion of the banks, raising capital or otherwise affecting the
behavior of these banks beyond mark et capital `requirements'.  Here we make precise
what we mean by `binding' regulatory capital requirements and discuss some  empirical
research on this topic.
Recall that we defined a bank's market capital `requireme nt' as the capital ratio
that maximizes the value of the bank in the absence of regulatory cap ital requirements
(and the mechanisms used to enforce them), but in the presence of the rest of the
regulatory structure that protects the safety and soundnes s of banks.  We will say that
regulatory capital requirements are `binding' if the capital ratio that  maximizes the
bank's value in the presence of regulatory capital requirements -- the `effective'
regulatory capital requirement -- is greater than the bank's market capital
`requirement'.43
      The `effective' regulatory capital ratio may be greater because of increases in the capital
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ratio numerator (e.g., more equity or subordinated debt), reductions in the denominator (fewer
assets or smaller RWA), or both.
The `effective' regulatory capital requirement is difficult to measure because it
may include a buffer above the regulatory capital minimum to allow the bank to
exploit unexpected profitable investment opportunities and to cushion the effects of
unexpected negative shocks as in the discussion of financial slack above.  The buffer
may be substantial if the regulat ory penalties for falling below the minimum are very
costly and if the transactions costs of raising capital quickly are very high.
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It is difficult to determine empirically whether capital  requirements are binding
in this sense, but a number of studies have attempted to show whether regulatory
capital requirements raised the amount of capital held.  The studies of the capital-to-
asset requirements of the 1980s generally suggested that these standards were
effective in raising capital-to-asset ratios (e.g., Wall and Peterson 1987).  Wall and
Petersen (1995) below address the question of whether RBC and other regulatory
changes in the early 1990s affected large bank holding companies (BHCs).  Their
method involves estimating disequilibrium models for each year.  Each BHC is
assigned a probability as to whether the regulatory regime or the market regime is
dominant in determining its capital ratio.  They find that the regulatory regime is
dominant in most cases, suggesting that regulatory capital requirements  often were
binding.
Securitization
Securitization is the transformation of traditional, non-traded bank assets into44
marketable securities.  Securitization may involve off-balance sheet guarantees such
as standby letters of credit or loan commitments that backup issuance of commercial
paper.  These off-balance sheet guarantees facilitate the borrower's access to other
sources of funds by adding the credit enhancement of t he bank.  This permits a partial
`unbundling' of the package of services combined in a tr aditional bank loan.  The bank
retains the responsibility for evaluating, monitoring, and bearing most of the credit
risk, but other parties provide the funds.  Loan sales without recourse accomplish a
further unbundling of the loan package.  A bank originates a loan just as in the
traditional case, but then sells the loan contract, along with the responsibility for
monitoring and bearing credit risk, to another party.  
Regulatory capital standards may have played a role in the expansion of both
types of securitization in t he 1980s.  Off-balance sheet guarantees were not subject to
capital requirements in the 1980s, so shifting from loans to these  guarantees may have
provided a way to reduce effective regulatory capital requirements.  A bank could
continue to be compensated fo r providing monitoring services and bearing credit risk,
but without regulatory capital requirements on part of its portfolio.
Off-balance sheet guarantees also tend to raise a bank's market capital
`requirement', independent of regulatory requirements.  This is because off-balance
sheet guarantees give a senior claim to the beneficiaries of the guarantees, letting
them keep the securitized asset in the event of bank failure (Benveniste  and Berger
1987).  This increases the risk of financial distress to the bank's creditors and
shareholders, and therefore tends to  raise market capital `requirements' for the bank.45
Thus, when effective regulatory capital requirements exceed market `requirements',
a shift toward off-balance guarantees tends to bring effective regulatory and market
requirements closer together both by lowering  regulatory requirements and by raising
market requirements. 
Capital standards in the 1980s l ed to allocative inefficiency by favoring the use
of off-balance sheet guarantees even when it may have been more efficient to provide
traditional bank loans.  Moreover, off-balance sheet guarantees allowed banks with
binding regulatory capital requirements to increase portfolio credit risks.
Loan sales without recourse may also reduce a bank's effective regulatory
capital requirements.  However, there are three important differences between
securitization by loan sales and securitization by means of off-balance sheet
guarantees.  First, loan sales generally raise the market and/or regulatory capital
requirement for the party that buys the loan, since th is type of securitization transfers
the credit risk away from the selling bank.    Second, loan sales generally  lower,
rather than raise the market capital `requirement' for the selling bank because the
bank's credit risk is reduced.  Third, the opportunity to reduce regulatory capital
requirements through loan sales is not likely to  lead to significant allocative
inefficiency or inappropriate risk-taking since the risk is tra nsferred to the buyers who
are subject to market and/or regulatory capital requirements.
One of the purposes of the Basle Accord on risk-based capital was to correct
some of the allocative inefficiencies and risk-taking incentives associated with off-
balance sheet guarantees.  For example, a standby letter of credit that guarantees46
financial performance is now subject to the same capital requirements as if the bank
instead extended a loan of the same magnitude to the counterparty of the guarantee.
But the risk-based standards may have cre ated other distortions.  For example, Avery
and Berger (1991a) showed that the requiremen t that loan commitments of more than
one year have 50% as much capital as loans to the same borrower may disco urage long-
term commitments unduly, and perversely penalize relatively safe banks.  
A number of studies have tested various hypotheses regarding securitization
activity, including the `regulatory tax  hypothesis' that capital requirements and other
regulatory incentives contributed significantly to the growth of financial guarantees
and loan sales in the 1980s.  The research ge nerally suggests that the probability that
a bank issued standby letters of credit was not significantly related to whether the
bank was above or below the regulatory capital standards.  However, the quantity of
standbys (given that some were issued by the bank) did appear to be influenced by
whether the bank was below regulatory standards.  The research on lo an commitments
generally suggests that capital requirements had little or no effect on commitment
activity.  Research on loan sales is mixed.  Early research suggested loan sales
increased when a bank was below the minimum regulatory capital requirement.
However, more recent research has shown that loan sales actually declined with the
introduction of risk-based capital requirements, even though they led to the sharpest
increase in capital for the large banks that dominate the loan sales market.  These
findings suggest that regu latory capital standards were not particularly important in47
      See Berger and Udell (1993) for a summary of this research.
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      Jagtiani et al also find that economic factors are more important than regulatory capital
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requirements for derivatives activities such as swaps, futures, and forwards, although such
contracts raise somewhat different concerns than securitization because they are not
substitutes for on-balance sheet financing.
explaining fluctuations in this market.  
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Two of the papers below take this line of research in new directions.  Jagtiani
et al (1995) model securitization activities as inn ovations with logistic diffusion cycles,
similar to the familiar models of  consumer adoption of electronic products.  They then
test whether changes in capital requirements affected the diffusion  paths using models
of the behavior of both the whole industry and individual banks.  They find that
changes in capital requirements had little effect on either o ff-balance sheet guarantees
or loan sales.  These results, which are broadly consist ent with the previous literature,
suggest that securitization is driven more by economic factors than regu latory factors.
28
Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) show that market capital `requirements ' function
similarly to regulatory requirements, encouraging loan sales even in the absence of
regulatory requirements.  In their model, loan sales arise when banks that have
comparative advantages in lending to local, information-problematic borrowers have
insufficient capital to make all such loans.  By selling loans to banks that are flush
with capital, the capital-deficient banks are able to exploit their comparative
advantages in lending and still maintain sufficient capital to reassure markets about
the safety of their remaining loans that are not sold.
Carlstrom and Samolyk's results  call into question some earlier empirical work
which concluded that regulatory capital requirements  caused much of the growth in48
      This problem does not affect Jagtiani et al. (1995), since they are able to identify changes
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in regulatory capital requirements by the dates that these regulations went into effect.
securitization.  If banks with capital below the regulatory minim ums have, on average,
capital that is also low relative to market `requirements ', an econometric identification
problem arises which has not been well addressed in the empirical studies.  The
finding that banks which violate the regulatory capital minimums are more often




The contraction in bank lending in the early 1990s may have been another
unintended outcome of changes in regulatory  capital requirements.  Some observers
have interpreted the observed shift from commercial and industrial loans into
Treasury securities and other assets as a consequence of the implementation of risk-
based capital (RBC) requirements.  Under RBC, commercial loans a re assigned a 100%
risk weight which requires the most capital, while Treasuries are assigned a 0% risk
weight which requires no capital.   This creates an incentive to substitute from loans
to Treasuries.  In addition, the prompt corrective action feature of FDICIA -- which
mandates increasingly severe regulatory pe nalties on banks as their RBC ratios fall --
accentuates the incentive s to substitute from commercial lending into Treasuries and
other assets in lower risk-weight categories.  Clearly, some reduction in commercial
loans extended by weakly capitalized banks should be regarded as an  intended
consequence of RBC and FDICIA.  But the magnitude and extent of the reduction in
loans -- large enough to be termed a `credit crunch' by some observers - - may have been49
      See Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Berger and Udell (1994), and Hancock and Wilcox
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(1994a) for tests of whether RBC caused a `credit crunch'.
      See Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1994, 1995a), and Hancock and
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Wilcox (1994a) for tests of whether regulatory leverage requirements caused a `credit crunch'.
an unintended consequence of these policies.   
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In addition to the implementation of RBC and FDICIA, regulatory capital
actions based on leverage ratios may also have contributed to a significant reduction
in the supply of commercial  credit by banks.  The 1990 leverage requirement -- which
mandated that banks hold capital of at least 3%  against unweighted assets -- gave
incentives for some banks to shrink their asset portfolios.  Moreover, because the
amount by which the required leverage capital ratio exceeded 3% depended upon the
bank's examination rating and the discretion of the regulator, banks may also have
switched out of assets with high  perceived credit risks, such as commercial loans, and
into safer assets, such as Treasurie s.  It is sometimes alleged that supervisors became
tougher on individual banks in the early 1990s and required higher capital-to-asset
ratios even before the official leverage requirements were in place.   
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A number of other hypotheses unrelated to increases in regulatory capital
requirements could also explain the observed reduction in commercial lending in the
early 1990s.  Briefly, these include the depletion of bank capital from loan loss
experiences of the late 1980s (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1994, 1995a), tightened
examination criteria and loan loss reserve policies by  regulators (e.g., Bizer 1993), a
voluntary reduction in risk by bank managers (e.g., H ancock and Wilcox 1993, 1994b),
a reduction in loan demand by business b ecause of macroeconomic/regional recessions50
      Evidence in support of these tentative conclusions includes the finding that RBC capital
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ratios are not consistently related to the change in lending behavior between the 1980s and the
early 1990s, but that the leverage ratio often is related to this change.
(e.g., Bernanke and Lown 1991, Hancock and  Wilcox 1993), and/or a secular decline
in the demand for bank loans because of the growth of alternative sources of credit
(e.g., Berger and Udell 1994).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the hypotheses based
on changes in regulatory capital requirements from each other and from the other
hypotheses.  To date, the evidence appears to  suggest that the implementation of RBC
did not cause a large reduction in lending, but that the leverage capital requirement
may be responsible for a significant portion of the observed change in portfolio
behavior.   Nevertheless, there is still much disagreement regarding these  conclusions,
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leaving ample room for additional research.
The two empirical papers below on the `credit crunch' investigate the effects of
the regulatory leverage requirements in new ways.  Hancock et al (1995) trace the
dynamic pattern of how bank portfolios reacted  to capital shocks in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and find some notable changes.  Specifically, the response of banks to
unanticipated drops in capital was more rapid in the early 1990s than in the late
1980s, especially for banks with capital-to-asset ratios  below 5 percent.  That is, banks
cut back lending more quickly in reaction to a loss of capital in the early 1990s,
particularly banks that were at or below regulatory capital-to-asset ratios.  This is
consistent with a regulator-induced cred it crunch in which implementation of tougher
leverage standards reduced lending in the early 1990s.  However, without specific51
      This result is also consistent with a Wall and Peterson (1995) finding that banks subject
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to regulatory orders raised more capital than other banks.
information regarding regulatory sanctions, it is virtually impossible to distinguish
between such a regulatory effect and the possibility that ma rket capital `requirements'
may also have tightened in the early 1990s.
Peek and Rosengren (1995b) provide evidence that helps resolve this
uncertainty about whether bank  responses to capital shortfalls were primarily driven
by regulatory versus market forces.  They gathered data on regulatory enforcement
actions in New England from 1989 through the early 1990s -- the time and region
which is most often identified with the `credit crunch'.  Regulato ry enforcement actions
almost always included a mandate to improve the bank's capital-to-asset ratio,
typically to a level of at least 6%.  Thus, if banks under enforcement actions reduced
their lending significantly more than similarly situated banks that were not under
such orders, this would be evidence in favor of a regulatory-induced credit crunch, as
opposed to a market reaction to economic factors.  Peek and Rosengren do find that
banks under enforcement actions r educed lending more than other banks in the same
region with the same capital-to-asset ratios, suppor ting the hypothesis that regulatory
actions contributed to the credit crunch.   Their analysis is somewhat limited by the
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difficulty of controlling for all the factors that might affect market capital
requirements, but it provides a promising approach to  disentangling regulatory and
market influences.
A complete understanding of how capital requirements affect lending requires
a broader analysis of how the supply and demand for loans interact.  Thakor and52
Wilson (1995) take the reduction in loan supply caused by risk-based capital as the
starting point for analysis and examine the supply-demand interactions.  They show
that an increase in capital requirements will cause banks to be less willing to
renegotiate loans in the future.  T his anticipated contraction in future supply of loans
may have substantial effects on the quantity of loans iss ued in the present.  Specifical-
ly, borrowers that are most likely to need renegotiation services in the future may
voluntarily shift from bank loans to issue debt directly in the capital mark ets, although
such borrowers may experience difficulty in gaining access to capital markets (Carey
et al 1993).  This analysis adds another dimension to debate over whether and how
regulatory changes may have reduced bank lending.
VII. Conclusions
The capital structure of financial instituti ons is determined in part by the same
departures from the frictionless world of M&M that determine the capital structures
of other firms -- taxes, expected costs of financial distress, transactions costs, and
signaling behavior and agency problems arising from asymmetr ic information between
shareholders and creditors and between owners and managers.  If raising capital
quickly is costly for any of these reasons, then financial institutions may hold
additional capital as financial slack to take advantage of unexpected profitable
opportunities or to guard against unexpected losses.  H owever, banks differ from other
firms in two important respects that affect their capital structures -- (1) the presence
of the regulatory safety net that protects  the safety and soundness of banks and likely
lowers bank capital, and (2) regulatory capital requirements that raise the capital of53
some banks.
We have defined a bank's m arket capital `requirement' as the ratio of equity to
assets that maximizes the value of the bank to distinguish it from regulatory capital
requirements.  The safety net for banks -- which includes federal deposit insurance,
unconditional payment guarantees, access to the discount window, and other bank
safety regulations (other than capital regulation) -- likely lowers market capital
`requirements' by insulating banks from potential market discipline.  This may help
explain why banks generally have the lowest equity-to-asset ratios of firms in any
industry, including financial institutions with similar portfolios that do n ot have access
to the safety net.  Our review of the historical evolution of bank capital ratios is
consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of various components of the
safety net played an importa nt role in the century-long decline in bank capital ratios.
Regulatory capital requirements are motivated by two main co ncerns.  First, the
safety net, particularly the deposit insurance component, makes the government the
largest uninsured creditor of most U.S. banks.  Regulatory capital  requirements are
a means to limit the risk exposure of the government and the taxpayers that stand
behind it in much the same way that market capital `requirements' protect other
creditors.  Second, regulatory capit al requirements protect the economy from negative
externalities caused by bank failures, especially systemic risk.  Regulatory capital
requirements, along with the safety net, help protect the financial system and real
economy from the destructive effects of contagious bank runs on solvent, but illiquid
banks.54
Unfortunately, regulatory capital requirements are a rather blunt tool for
controlling bank risk taking.  Capital is difficult to define, measure, and monitor.
Ideally, financial instruments that coun t as regulatory capital should provide a buffer
against loss to the government, serve as `patient money' that cannot be redeemed
during a financial crisis, and help discipline bank  risk-taking behavior.  Equity and
subordinated debt are the most plausible candidates for inclusion as regul atory capital,
but neither meets all three objectives perfectly.
Both the numerator and denominator of regulatory capital ratios pose
significant measurement problems.  The `regulatory value of equity' to be used in the
numerator depends on the market values of all on- and off-balance sheet  assets and
liabilities adjusted for limited liability.  Because banks specialize in lending to and
providing guarantees for informa tionally opaque borrowers, the values of bank assets
are difficult to measure and monitor.  The denominator of the capital ratio -- the
variability of the regulatory value of equity -- is even more difficult to measure, but
some progress is being made.
Because binding regulatory capital requirements are c ostly, they involve a long-
run social tradeoff between the benefits of reducing the risk of the negative external-
ities from bank failures and the costs of reducing bank intermediation.  Inaccuracies
in setting capital requirements may worsen this tradeoff because higher capital is
needed on average to achieve a given level of safety, thus reducing intermediation.
Problems in setting regu latory capital requirements may have some additional
unintended consequences.  Capital requirements may give incentives for some banks55
to increase their risks of failure.  Moreover, inaccuracies in setting capital
requirements distort relative prices and may create allo cative inefficiencies that divert
financial resources from their most productive uses.  During the 1980s, capital
requirements may have created artificial incentives for b anks to take off-balance sheet
risks, and changes in capital requirements in the 1990s may have contributed to a
credit crunch.
This introductory article has emphasized many of the unresolved issues
concerning the role of capital in financial institutions.  The articles which follow
represent some of the best current efforts to advance this research agenda.  They
enhance our understanding of how ma rket and regulatory capital requirements affect
financial institution behavior and highlight additional questions that remain a
challenge to future research.REFERENCES
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